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Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?
David Glick⇤† Florian J. Boge⇤‡
Abstract
Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analyti-
cally true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist
about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical re-
ality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic
approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
1 Introduction
The Reality Criterion plays a central role in Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s
argument against the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM).1
Reality Criterion (RC): If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can
predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of
a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding
to that quantity. (Einstein et al., 1935, p.777)
RC shares much of the intuitive appeal of scientific realism. On the basis of
certain predictions, it licenses claims about objective reality, which may then be
used to explain our successful predictive practices. But, unlike scientific realism,
RC only appeals to specific kinds of predictions made with certainty. It then
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1Whether the Reality Criterion is needed to make EPR’s point is another question. In
his own (individual) presentations of the argument, Einstein does not include the Reality
Criterion, which may cast doubt on his commitment to the principle (Fine, 1986, p.62).
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allows us to infer the existence of something in reality corresponding to the
predicted value of the quantity in question, e.g., some property of the system
under study.
By focusing on predictions that can be made with certainty, which EPR
identify with probability one assignments, RC represents a substantially weaker
connection between our predictions and the world than full-blown scientific re-
alism. RC requires ontological commitment to substantially less than the full
content of quantum theory that traditional realism would seem to endorse.
Yet, certain proposed interpretations of QM must reject RC. QBism (which
originally stood for “quantum Bayesianism”), for instance, maintains that the
probabilities delivered by QM correspond to agents’ subjective degrees of belief
about their future experiences (e.g., of measurement outcomes). Hence, there
is the possibility, on QBism, to be perfectly certain about the outcome of some
measurement—even assign it a probability equal to unity—without there being
anything in reality that corresponds to the predicted outcome (cf., Fuchs et al.,
2014).
Maudlin (2014), however, claims that RC is not merely reasonable (as EPR
find it), but analytically true:
...[RC] is, in the parlance of philosophers, analytic. That is, this
criterion follows just from the very meanings of the words used in
it. The di↵erence is this: one can coherently (but not reasonably!)
deny a merely reasonable claim, but one can’t coherently deny an
analytic proposition. (Maudlin, 2014, p.6, original emphasis)
Analytic claims are true or false in virtue of meanings alone. To give the
standard example, one can see that all bachelors are unmarried without any
empirical knowledge—its truth simply follows from what we mean by “bache-
lor.” If RC is analytically true, as Maudlin maintains, its denial is incoherent.
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To reject RC is to fail to grasp the meanings of the terms involved.
Werner (2014, p. 6) rightly points out that RC is a criterion, i.e., a su cient
condition for identifying elements of reality, and that analyticity is something
that traditionally applies to statements or judgments. However, consider the
following conditional: “for all men, if we can ascertain that they are unmarried,
then we may infer that they are bachelors.” This conditional provides a cri-
terion for checking whether (grown) men are indeed bachelors: just investigate
their marital status. But like the corresponding statement, the criterion itself
might be called “analytic,” as denying its applicability would imply a want of
understanding of the terms involved.
Below, we will argue that RC is not analytic. However, there is a deeper
worry that we suspect motivates Maudlin’s claim: that QBism and views like it
end up doing away with physical reality altogether. QBism is one of a family
of broadly epistemic approaches which regard the quantum state as a reflec-
tion of an agent’s knowledge, information, or beliefs.2 Other examples include
Healey’s pragmatist interpretation (Healey, 2017), Friederich’s therapeutic view
(Friederich, 2015), or Boge’s neo-Kantian approach (Boge, 2018).
These approaches reject RC as part of a more general rejection of the com-
mon representational role a↵orded to QM, a theory which these approaches un-
derstand, in the first instance, as a guide for agents navigating the world. The
worry is this: because of the many known restrictions to supplementing further
variables to it (e.g., Bell, 1964; Pusey et al., 2012; Brukner, 2018; Frauchiger
and Renner, 2018), the abandonment of the representational role of QM seems
to imply a form of solipsism or idealism (Norsen, 2016; Brown, 2019). If RC
is taken to be a minimal realist commitment, then its rejection may imply the
2It should be noted that the broad reading of “epistemic” taken here avoids the factive
connotation usually associated with knowledge (e.g., Timpson, 2008, Sect. 2.3). Alternatively
(and more precisely), one could characterize QBism and related views as doxastic approaches
to QM (e.g., Boge 2018, Sect. 7.2; DeBrota et al. 2018).
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abandonment of physical reality altogether. We shall argue below that this
alternative understanding of RC’s status is mistaken as well.
2 Maudlin’s Argument
In defense of his claim that RC is analytic, Maudlin o↵ers the following:
...suppose, as the criterion demands, that I can without in any way
disturbing a system predict with certainty the value of a physical
quantity (for example, predict with certainty how the system will
react in some experiment). Then, first, there must be some physical
fact about the system that determines it will act that way.... Second,
if the means of determining this did not disturb the system, then the
relevant element of reality obtained even before the determination
was made, and indeed obtained independently of the determination
being made. (Maudlin, 2014, p.7, original emphasis)
Maudlin’s argument supposes one is in a position to predict with certainty
the outcome of some measurement on a system without disturbing the system.
That is, there is some physical quantity associated with observable A and one
is certain that the outcome of a measurement Oi will yield a particular value of
a of A: prob(Oa) = 1.3 Maudlin’s argument centers on two key claims about
such a situation:
1. There is some physical fact about the system that determines it will behave
so as to yield Oa.
2. The physical fact in question is independent of the non-disturbing proce-
dure by which we come to know prob(Oa) = 1.
3A distinction may be drawn between the outcome of a measurement and a physical quan-
tity taking a particular value. As stated, RC concerns only the latter, which may render it
inapplicable on certain interpretations of QM (see Healey, 2017, p.101).
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This physical fact—the determinant of Oa—is the element of reality corre-
sponding to the value a of the physical quantity A that appears in RC. One
needn’t identify the physical fact with the system’s possession of the value a of
A. So long as there is some physical fact about the system that determines Oa
will occur if one measures A, one has found a fact corresponding to A. On some
interpretations, the physical fact in question is the system possessing value a of
A, but other interpretations will deny this for some observables. For instance,
the Bohmian may point to a spatial configuration of particles as the determi-
nant of a measurement concerning an ostensibly non-spatial observable. The
intuition here is that without some such prior (or independent) physical fact,
we wouldn’t be in a position to be certain of the measurement outcome.
3 Objections
3.1 Subjectivism
Claim (1) is motivated by the certainty of the outcome Oa. In standard QM, the
probability of a measurement outcome is given by the quantum state assigned
to the system and the Born rule. Here we suppose that the standard formalism
of QM delivers prob(Oa) = 1—i.e., certainty with respect to finding the system
to be a. So far so good. But why suppose that this probability claim requires
an underlying physical fact that “determines” Oa?
Indeed, there is long tradition of denying the inference from certainty to re-
ality. The subjectivist (or personalist) school maintains that probability state-
ments correspond to agents’ subjective degrees of belief. Thus, prob( ) = 1
means only that one is certain of  , which need not imply that   is the case. In
the context of QM, subjectivism has been explicitly advocated by QBists (Caves
et al., 2007; Fuchs et al., 2014). For the QBist, when QM delivers a probability
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of 1, this indicates that an agent’s beliefs—reflected in the quantum state she
ascribes—suggest that she should be certain to experience the outcome in ques-
tion. But, of course, this doesn’t imply that there is some physical fact about
the system that ensures the outcome; probability 1 statements are a reflection
of agent’s degrees of belief just like any other probability statement.
In defense of (1), Maudlin claims that “if a system is certain to do some-
thing physical, then something in its physical state entails that it will do it”
(Maudlin, 2014, p.7, original emphasis). However, this begs the question against
the subjectivist, who takes “it is certain that the system will  ” to mean “some
agent is certain that the system will  ,” which needn’t imply anything about
the physical state of the system.
Now, Maudlin may reply that RC’s phrase “we can predict with certainty”
implies not just that one can be certain, but that one would be correct in doing
so. If this is the case, then perhaps we do need some physical state to provide the
basis for one’s prediction. But, this move is also question begging and, at any
rate, not particularly helpful. First, on the classic subjective Bayesian approach
which inspires QBism, there are only coherence constraints—i.e., conformity to
the probability axioms and Bayesian updating. Thus, it doesn’t make sense to
speak of a single-case probability as “correct” or “incorrect.” Second, even if
we grant that one is “correct” or “justified” in being certain that   will occur in
the future (or would occur if the measurement were performed), this certainty
needn’t require a physical determinant be present in the system now (or in
the actual world). One could be justifiably certain about a future event in an
indeterministic universe, in which case there would be no prior determinant
of the event (cf., Lewis, 2019, pp.38–39). Suppose, for instance, that there is
an oracle who has direct access to a future measurement event, the outcome of
which is the result of a random, indeterministic process. One could be justifiably
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certain to find Oa without the presence of a feature of the system now that
determines the outcome of this future measurement.4
3.2 Objectivism
The objectivist holds that probabilities are genuine features of reality. Even
on this understanding, one may wish to resist the move from prob(Oi) = 1 to
Oi being determined to occur. First, indeterministic laws may assign a future
event a probability of 1. One may wish to deny that the event in question was
determined to occur. Second, there are cases which suggest that probability 0
events are not impossible, or determined not to occur. An objectivist persuaded
by such cases will deny that probability 1 events must occur, or are determined
to occur.5
There are several well-known cases. Consider, for instance, a dart with
a perfectly defined tip thrown at a dartboard. On the standard probability
calculus, the probability that it hits a particular point is 0, but it is possible
that it does so. Or, consider a fair coin flipped an infinite number of times. The
probability of any given sequence—e.g., all heads—is 0, but some such sequence
must occur. Some cases can be dealt with by allowing for a non-standard
probability measure that assigns infinitesimal probabilities to each event in an
infinite outcome space. But, Williamson (2007) argues that this strategy fails
in the infinite coin flip case.
Granting that such cases exist leads to inconsistency if one assumes that
4Note that the subjectivist needn’t deny the existence of all physical properties of a system
to reject RC, but only those that are both (a) attributed on the basis of a probability one
statement from QM and (b) determine the outcome of a future measurement. They may, for
instance, attribute physical properties to a system associated with its preparation, but such
properties will meet neither condition. Preparation procedures may be described without
appeal to QM and the laws are indeterministic with respect to preparations and measurement
outcomes.
5We assume that if an event is determined to occur by some actual event, then it must
occur. Of course, di↵erent laws of nature might allow for a determined event not to occur, so
the necessity involved is physical or nomological.
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prob( ) = 1 ensures that   occurs. In particular, this supposition could lead to
a situation in which 8 ¬(  will occur) and yet 9 (  will occur). As a result,
some will deny the general principle that prob( ) = 0 ensures that   will not
occur and, correspondingly, that prob( ) = 1 ensures that   will occur. This
applies just as much to the objectivist about probabilities as to the subjectivist.
An objectivist account of quantum probabilities that squares with these gen-
eral considerations has been developed, e.g., by Stairs (2011).6 Stairs advocates
a minimal objectivism according to which objective quantum probabilities are
grounded in facts about the actual world. However, he rejects the inference from
a measurement outcome with objective probability 1 to a property of the target
system: “[W]hen Alice makes her probability-one claim about Bob’s qubit, she
does not need to infer pre-existing properties nor attribute counterfactuals. On
the contrary, if she wants to square her objectivism with causal locality, those
are exactly the things she should not do” (Stairs, 2011, p.165). On Stairs’ view,
quantum theory provides us with objective probabilities in virtue of capturing
global statistical patterns, not local intrinsic properties.
4 Whither Physical Reality?
Given the di culties that beset Maudlin’s argument, we contend that RC is not
analytically true. As a consequence, views that deny RC (e.g., QBism) cannot
be dismissed as incoherent on this basis.
However, RC is a modest representational thread linking QM and reality,
and hence, one may view its denial as abandonment of the physical world. This
suggests a revision of Maudlin’s analyticity claim: one cannot deny RC without
abandoning physical reality altogether.
Indeed, this worry may be thought to be underscored by a number of “no go”
6Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this work to our attention.
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results that appear to push quantum epistemicists toward ever more subjective
positions. Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964) and more recent results (e.g., Pusey et al.
(2012); Brukner (2018); Frauchiger and Renner (2018); Healey (2018); Leegwa-
ter (2018)) are taken by some to require that subjectivism cannot be limited
to quantum states, but infects other facets of the epistemicist picture, such as
Hamiltonians and measurement results. Thus, one may wonder what is left to
form the basis of physical reality. If there are no quantum states, probabilities,
or even measurement results in external reality, perhaps nothing remains but
the contents of an agent’s mind.
However, even if one adopts a thoroughgoing subjectivism about QM, solip-
sism or idealism need not result. It is perfectly consistent to maintain both that
(a) there is a physical reality and (b) that QM doesn’t (directly) represent it.
Certain epistemic approaches reject RC as a link between theory and reality,
but they allow for a more indirect connection between the two. At the very
minimum, they may maintain that reality is such that QM is a good guide for
the agents who find themselves in it. Such a view may be unsatifisying for one
who shares Maudlin’s realist inclinations, but it is far from incoherent. In fact,
QBism aims to go further than this. For instance, QBists claim that the Born
rule “correlates with something that one might want to call ‘real’” (Fuchs, 2017,
p.119). Such claims of objectivity in QBism certainly require some unpacking,
but they provide a glimmer of a more indirect route to reality.
We conclude that opponents of QBism and other epistemic approaches to
QM must do more than merely dismiss these views as incoherent or inconsistent
with the existence of physical reality.
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